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This essay considers how policy thinking about culture has been steadily transformed 
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Policy ideas first fully developed in the UK have had a global resonance: the 
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New thinking is now required. 
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Introduction 
In reflections on different forms of academic writing, the philosopher Vilém Flusser 
(2002: 194) remarked that the ‘essay is not merely the articulation of a thought, but of 
a thought as a point of departure for a committed existence’. The virtues of this 
particular style of expression greatly appeal to me for present purposes, which involve 
the somewhat dogged pursuit of an argument because it matters greatly. Flusser 
counter-posed this style of argument to what he called the ‘academicism’ of the 
treatise, which claimed the qualities of rigour and detachment. Were he one of our 
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contemporaries writing about the creative economy, he would probably inveigh 
against the fetishism of ‘evidence-led policy’, which has been key to the discourse I 
shall describe here.  
 
This piece is less essayistic than I would wish. It pays obeisance to the need to 
document the case in ways that befit this 30th anniversary contribution to Innovation 
and naturally, it must be referenced, as the detail will be unfamiliar to many readers. 
The slightly polemical tone is a necessary antidote to scholasticism and mealy-
mouthed approval. I have been increasingly struck by how difficult it is not to talk 
approvingly and largely uncritically about the ‘creative industries’ and the ‘creative 
economy’. These tropes presently dominate policy debate and media discussion about 
culture. This discursive dominance has become both a conceptual and practical 
obstacle to thinking afresh and in the round about culture and the complexity of 
cultural work in the digital age. In short, I would contend that the idea of the creative 
economy has increasingly obscured and crowded out conceptions of culture that are 
not in some way subordinate to economic considerations. Intelligent policy-makers 
and smart government advisers know that this is so and that their evidence rests on 
uncertain ground – at least, that is what they tell me privately. What figures in such 
conversations does not, on the whole, enter the public domain because the expedient 
argument that turns culture into economic value is seen as the only really 
comprehensible and sellable formula in our times. That is one of my conclusions from 
empirical research on and engagement in this topic.  
 
The cultural analyst, George Yúdice, has described how a particular version of what 
he terms the ‘expediency of culture’ has come to dominate public discourse and key 
institutions, both global and national.  The state’s interest in culture, he argues, is 
presently legitimized by instrumental and utilitarian arguments. First, he contends, 
this is due to the scale of migration in a globalized world: this has rendered 
problematic ‘the use of culture as a national expedient’ through which a common 
value system for a citizenry might be built. Second, he suggests that in the USA the 
end of Cold War ideological competition led to the withdrawal of much public 
subvention for the arts. A rapid shift ensued to ‘an expanded conception of culture 
that can solve problems, including job creation. … Because almost all actors in the 
cultural sphere have latched onto this strategy, culture is no longer experienced, 
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valued, or understood as transcendent.’ This means that ‘artists are being channeled to 
manage the social’ and have become the focus of a specialized couche of ‘managerial 
professionals’ (Yúdice 2003: 11-12).1  
 
That expert grouping includes not only cultural bureaucrats but also academics, as I 
can testify. Over the past couple of decades, I have been deeply involved, over 
considerable periods of time, as a board member or adviser in the work of several 
bodies in the UK concerned with culture and media.2 That experience has reinforced 
my view that in the field of cultural policy the pragmatic adaptation to ruling ideas – 
conformity often without conviction, if you like – is a functional and highly 
serviceable equivalent to committed belief.  
 
Because this article is anatomizing a resilient ideology, in all probability it will be 
cited by similar-minded critics but ignored where it really counts – namely, by those 
with the greatest power to frame strategies and practices in cultural policy. That is an 
observation and certainly not a complaint, as we can and do make choices about the 
spaces we occupy in an ‘intellectual field’ – to use Pierre Bourdieu’s phrase - and 
these decisions duly shape the strategies that we then pursue. As with earlier pieces 
that I have written on this theme (Schlesinger 2007; 2009; 2013), I know that the 
central argument will bounce off the resilient carapace of creative economy 
adherents’ belief-system. The same may be said for the related work of like-minded 
critical colleagues internationally (Bustamante 2011). There is indeed a ‘counter-
discourse’ (Vötsch and Weiskopf 2009) that critiques the assumptions and blind spots 
of creative economy thinking but although of analytical importance, this has not 
influenced the juggernaut’s seemingly inexorable progress. To be ignored in these 
matters, then, perhaps confers a perverse badge of honour. It is not that interested and 
contending parties cannot quite politely and even amicably discuss their different 
perspectives. It is, rather, that when it comes to the public projection of argument and 
analysis, there is no great meeting of minds. Rather, there is an increasing tendency 
for contending views to become self-sustaining and self-contained. 
 
This is not the place for a detailed deconstruction of the different forms of discourse 
that substantiate these contentions. In an imperfectly realized essay such as this, one 
may let the contention stand and offer passing illustration rather than seek to provide 
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exhaustive demonstration. If we take recent academic compilations of work in the 
field as an indication of the existence of different camps gathered under distinct 
conceptual banners, these offer a useful marker of, for instance, the divergence 
between advocates of the ‘creative economy’ and proponents of the ‘cultural 
economy’ (Jones et al. 2015; Oakley and O’Connor 2015). For the latter, rallying 
round this term may offer an alternative starting point for those opposed to the 
economization of culture.  
 
The politics of recent discourse 
The origins of the discourse of the creative economy are indeed political, sensu 
stricto, because it is positions taken by governments that have most often have been 
the prime movers of this kind of perspective. Given its reproductive character, much 
of the discourse itself falls into another specific, subordinate, category, namely the 
expert domain of policy-making and practical implementation (Maasen and Weingart 
2005).  
 
Both official and expert discourses that find their way into reports, parliamentary 
debate and academic works in the cultural field are commonly recycled rather 
uncritically by media reports, taken seriously by not a few academics seeking 
funding, and most consequentially, become embedded in the practice of intermediary 
bodies acting in, and on, the cultural field. This incorporation into thought and 
practice takes place at various, interconnected, levels of the global system: in world 
bodies such as the United Nations (notably, UNESCO); inside regional entities such 
as the European Union (EU); and, of course, within states.  
 
To understand how a particular form of political discourse is fashioned and 
disseminated we need to explain its conditions of existence – in particular, the agency 
of the producers, the material and symbolic means at their disposal, and the interests 
that they pursue. We may think of such discourses as situated within intellectual fields 
that are constituted as spaces of contestation: loci in which strategies are pursued by 
given groups and individuals by way of contention in argument, the provision of 
evidence and the fashioning of symbolic representations, and also in respect of fierce 
competition for public attention and the quest to secure positions of influence in 
government and public bodies.  
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What Bourdieu (1993) calls the ‘cycle of consecration’ – the development of 
reputation, if you like – is quite distinctive when it comes to selling policy. It is 
different, for instance, from creating demand for an artwork or artist. Rather, it is a 
matter of flooding the market with an ideology so as to crowd out or marginalize 
alternatives. To establish and defend such symbolic capital requires continual effort in 
securing the dominance of a given set of definitions. It is the need for such continuous 
action to secure definitional advantage that explains the repetitive (if continually 
modified) discursive production in the field. 
 
If the struggle to command attention and, with it, the desire to occupy the 
commanding heights of credibility, is central to the pursuit of argument in the politics 
of policy, the distribution of resources to prepare discursive strategies is of key 
importance in how well it equips antagonists to perform in the public domain.  
 
The structural advantage in framing policies often (but not invariably) lies with 
official and expert sources, which tend to peddle a rather simple storyline when it 
comes to presenting accounts prefabricated for media reporting. Typically, the UK 
Government’s Creative industries economic estimates 2015 told us that one in 12 UK 
jobs was in the creative economy and that the creative industries accounted for 5.6% 
of total employment and also 5% of the UK economy’s turnover (DCMS 2015: 4). 
This became headline news – and more importantly, common sense. 
 
If we restrict ourselves to considering only policy outputs that appear in the public 
domain, we end up failing to recognise that sub rosa there has already been 
considerable lobbying and manoeuvring within a policy community to favour given 
options. Seemingly authoritative pronouncements are commonly the outcome of a 
hidden process of selection and elaboration inside government and related policy 
elites. Hidden, because it is largely conducted behind the scenes. But that does not 
mean it is secret. Such dealings can sometimes be reconstructed by way of research 
(Schlesinger 2009).  
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The creative turn 
How did the so-called creative turn become so pervasive? And what is the ‘creative 
economy’ supposed to be? 
The tale could be told in several ways. One illustrative account goes as follows. It was 
the marketing of the term the ‘creative industries’ in 1997-1998 by the first British 
New Labour government, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, which firmly put this 
trope on the national agenda. Then, as the ideas caught on beyond the UK, they 
shifted by stages onto the global plane. Creative industries discourse was developed 
as a political-economic project in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) by the team around Chris Smith, New Labour Secretary of State for that 
ministry. Expertise provided by think tanks, policy advisers, and industry figures 
contributed significantly to shaping the policy process (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015).  
The socio-linguist Norman Fairclough (2000: 22-23) has shown how ‘assumptions 
about the global economy’ led to an emphasis on competition between Britain and 
other countries’, a ‘project of renewal designed to improve Britain’s competitive 
position’. In the UK, this framework has remained in place, irrespective of the 
government in power.  
 
Thus, contrary to the view that the intellectuals are at best a marginal force in our 
society – that they have become mere ‘interpreters’, rather than ‘legislators’ in the 
terms espoused by Zygmunt Bauman (1992) – there is plainly a public policy 
intelligentsia eager to shape the world of cultural policy through discourse and action. 
The production of discourse and related policy proposals has now continued for some 
two decades in the UK and not only there, because ideas have circulated globally 
through policy spaces and institutions, and moreover, become increasingly embedded 
in academic research and teaching internationally. 
Reflecting in retrospect, former UK Culture Secretary Chris Smith (2013) – himself 
part of the policy intelligentsia – has remarked:  
In 1998 – as secretary of state for culture, media and sport in the newly-
elected Labour government – I published a book, Creative Britain. In it, I 
argued that the arts were for everyone, not just the privileged few; and 
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that the creative industries – dependent for their success on individual 
artistic creativity – had moved from the fringes to the centre of the UK 
economy, with huge benefits for the social and economic health of the 
nation. I called for the nurturing and celebration of creative talent to be at 
the heart of the political agenda. 
This quotation – reflecting afterthoughts some 15 years on – encapsulates the 
essentials of the creative economy belief system. 
It was not Smith’s book, however, that became the original keystone of the discourse. 
Looking back, it is striking just how much an expediently written policy paper came 
to exert an exceptional influence in generating an initial framework for discussion. 
The UK DCMS’s definition of the creative industries in the very first Creative 
Industries Mapping Document has been cited copiously not only in the Anglosphere 
but everywhere:  
 
Those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and 
talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the 
generation and exploitation of intellectual property.  (1998: 3) 
 
The key move was to aggregate 13 distinct fields of cultural practice, to designate 
these as ‘industries’, and so to constitute a new policy object whose central purpose 
was  - and remains - to ‘maximise economic impact … at home and abroad’. 
Moreover, by making the exploitation of intellectual property so crucial, the 
complexity of cultural value was subordinated to economic value.  
 
Some have denounced this approach as the acme of neo-liberalism – understood in 
this instance as the celebration of individualistic entrepreneurship in a free market. As 
a corrective, in their definitive new book on New Labour cultural policy, 
Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015) have rightly pointed to wider objectives pursued by the 
British creativistas - the boost to arts spending, the attempts at social inclusion, the 
educational aspirations. The question, perhaps, is how much these other goals have 
truly acted as counterweights to the centrality of economics. 
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Naturally, the ‘creative turn’ had antecedents. One influential interpretation of the 
history of pertinent ideas suggests that the conceptual journey started with the ‘culture 
industry’ of mass communication critiqued by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
(1997 [1944]). Subsequently, this approach was reformulated by figures such as 
Nicholas Garnham (1990[1984]) in Britain and Bernard Miège (2004 [1984]) in 
France, who developed a Marxist political economy of the ‘cultural industries’ (to 
which media were central). The political economization of culture became the 
intellectual basis for cultural industries policies pursued by left-wing policy-makers as 
one response to urban decline and de-industrialization, and also in some instances 
(notably in France) as part of the struggle to secure necessary material conditions for 
combatting cultural imperialism (Mattelart et al. 1983). Later, New Labour recoded 
these concerns in their ‘creative industries’ trope. Ever since, that particular 
formulation has been used incessantly and widely, irrespective of the political colour 
of its protagonists or indeed, the nature of their political regime.  
 
Creative industries thinking became a kind of blueprint to be applied or modified. 
Read the official and academic literature and you will find that the number and type 
of ‘industries’ may – and do - vary from one country to another. And then, at times, 
the ‘cultural industries’ may be carefully distinguished from ‘creative industries’, with 
culture often depicted as more fundamental or at the core of a society’s symbolic 
production (The Work Foundation 2007). What, however, remains common and 
largely undisturbed is the overall strategy pursued by many states: namely, to 
construct the creative industries and latterly, the ‘creative economy’, as a policy 
object that can be managed to secure primarily economic and sometimes social 
outcomes so as to increase competitiveness.  
 
The economization of national culture is a globally attractive proposition. Any nation 
can adopt it and policy transfer has proven relatively easy. The creative industries 
idea is protean and can be readily indigenized to fit local circumstances. It can 
become the official policy of the Chinese Communist Party or a development 
ideology espoused by the United Nations (Keane 2007; United Nations 2013). It can 
be used supra-nationally, at nation-state or sub-state levels, and in the region or city. 
Consequently, creative nations, regions, and cities, are now so much part of the 
competitive landscape that everyone takes them for granted. First, the curatorial 
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institutions invent new spaces, and then they seek to employ themselves to mow the 
lawns and trim the hedges that they have themselves designed.  
 
Thus, for instance, what is called ‘creative place-making’ (Markusen 2014) is an 
inherently restless, unfinished process, because new icons of brand differentiation 
have continually to be found and new policies to be devised the better to compete, for 
instance, in film, TV, games, mega-events or performances. Or new incentives have 
to be found to stimulate the earth-scouring quest for location and relocation. This 
means that the marketplace for cultural gabfests for the likeminded and the demand 
for advice by creative consultants is never exhausted. Neither is the continuous flow 
of academic commentary nor the litany of instruction to up-and-coming generations 
on how best to prepare themselves for pursuing the chimera of creative 
entrepreneurship.  
 
If the UK made the initial policy moves, it was in the USA that the best-known 
academic interventions were initially fashioned. The economist, Richard Caves 
(2000), was first to offer a serious book-length analysis of the creative industries. His 
work avoided the now commonplace fetishization of the term. He wrote of diverse 
‘creative goods’ that had something in common – contending rightly that the 
production of films, recorded music, the visual arts, and cultural events and 
performances are all highly risky in terms of any calculation of success or failure. 
Caves focused on the specifics of contracts and the industrial organization of relevant 
sectors. He did not create a unitary policy object. That was left to others. 
 
Hot on his heels, another US economist, Richard Florida (2002), writing in a very 
different, more popular, style took centre stage, to conjure up and hail the rise of the 
‘creative class’. In essence, he sold the attractive notion to policy-makers that almost 
one-third of Americans could be classified as ‘creative’ and that by making sure that 
local conditions were right for those engaged in cultural work, a wide range of places 
could be transformed into creative cities or regions. In this funky re-versioning of 
Alvin Gouldner’s (1979) New Class theory, erstwhile symbol-manipulating 
intellectuals were restyled as productive creatives. Of course, even earlier, post-
industrial theorists such as Daniel Bell had presaged such thinking (1973) but not with 
such resounding policy éclat. 
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Enter the creative economy 
It was a short step from increasingly pervasive talk about creative industries to the 
follow-on coinage of the creative economy that now dominates the scene. We may 
interpret this locution as an invitation to think of designated industries as systemically 
interconnected, as constituting a whole. The British business consultant, John 
Howkins (2001), first effectively marketed this notion. Like the UK’s DCMS, he laid 
emphasis on the value of intellectual property and the consequent ‘global battle for 
comparative advantage’. From this perspective, creativity becomes interesting 
because it is identified with ‘human capital’ – a terminology that by analogy first and 
foremost defines human beings as the objects of various kinds of investment – 
education to the fore – that might enhance the qualities of labour (Becker 2008). 
 
For the most part, the ‘creative economy’ has been a mobilizing slogan. It has been 
deployed alongside a range of cognate ideas – and associated practical interventions. 
The incessant conceptual parade includes ‘creative cities’, ‘creative innovation’, 
‘creative skills’, ‘creative education’ and ‘creative ecology’. Moreover, as during the 
past decade the digital revolution has reshaped policy thinking everywhere, the 
‘creative turn’ has spawned compound neologisms that try to capture current 
transformations in production, circulation and consumption: the ‘digital creative 
economy’ is a case in point.  
 
The EU provides an illuminating case study of diffusion. While not all member states 
have taken up the creative economy cause with equal enthusiasm, by degrees the 
European Commission (EC) has been won over to treating it as something to be taken 
into account. The creative and cultural industries (CCIs) are at the heart of the 
European Agenda for Culture, part of the framework of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy for 
Jobs and Growth, originally set out in March 2000.3 In May 2007, the European 
Council endorsed the role that the CCIs might play in supporting the Lisbon Strategy 
and in April 2008, the European Parliament (EP) welcomed the Council and 
Commission’s recognition of the importance of culture and creativity for the 
European project. 
The EP singled out the contribution of The Economy of Culture in Europe, a report 
commissioned by the EC in 2006 from KEA, a Brussels-based consultancy. This was 
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an undoubted scene-setter for the EU’s ‘creative turn’. It has been followed by a 
plethora of other reports. We might note another major contemporary reference point 
as, in fact, the creative turn has been global. The Creative Economy Report 2013 
(United Nations 2013) and, in 2008 and 2010, its predecessor versions, have set the 
frame for much subsequent global debate and policy work.  
 
The EU uses the CCI formulation as a diplomatic balancing act between states that 
stress cultural industries and those that emphasize creative industries but overall it is 
presently inflected towards the economization of culture.  
 
In the second of its major reports for the EC, The Impact of Culture on Creativity, 
KEA (2009: 3; emphasis added) further reworked the conceptual landscape and posed 
the problem in this way: 
 
The objective of the study is to have a better understanding of the 
influence of culture on creativity, a motor of economic and social 
innovation.  
As ‘productivity gains at manufacturing level are no longer sufficient to establish a 
competitive advantage’, what is needed is ‘culture-based creativity - the kind of 
thinking beyond production that has made Apple such a global force in design, or 
Virgin’s adding to the “experience” of long-haul aviation’. From a policy point of 
view, the argument was intended to insert creativity into innovation policy, among 
whose objectives was to ‘[b]rand Europe as the place to create’ along with 
establishing new programmes, institutions and regulatory frameworks to support 
‘creative and cultural collaboration’. The key ambition, though – still a work in 
progress involving several different collaborators – was ‘to establish a Creativity 
Index (with a set of 32 indicators) whose aim is to assess the creative environment in 
EU Member States and to enable the development of a creative ecology in Europe 
through art and culture’ (KEA 2009: 9). The creative economy policy agenda from 
the very beginning has been a pitch to governments everywhere to change the 
emphasis of policy making.  
A clear turning point was reached inside the EU by 2010, by which time the creative 
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economy had become part of the EC’s doxa. Its Green Paper (European Commission 
2010) was an omnium gatherum of things that CCIs might do for economic 
development anywhere, and a rehearsal of what by now had become the conventional 
wisdom about their nature and role.4 The EC was seeking a strategy in the context of 
global competition, embodied in Europe2020 as well as steps taken to develop a 
European Agenda for Culture. The Green Paper pointed forward to what has since 
become a strategic concern with the ‘digital economy’: the creation of ‘a true single 
market for online content and services’; an Innovation Union that would ‘strengthen 
the role of CCIs as a catalyst for innovation and structural change’; and the Strategy 
on Intellectual Property, especially ‘the use and management of rights’ (European 
Commission 2010: 6, 8).  
The uneven diffusion of creative industries discourse 
While the creative policy turn has not by any means produced uniformity of thinking 
inside the EU, there is no doubt that it has impacted on the terms in which culture is 
thought about in policy-making circles. Two responses illustrate the point. Others 
could be cited. 
 
In Italy, the European Year of Creativity and Innovation 2009 was launched with the 
local aim of ‘growing the awareness of creativity and innovation, key competences 
for personal, social and economic development’ (Rolando 2009: 1). It involved 
collaboration between various government departments in the wake of publication of 
the Libro bianco sulla creatività (White Paper on creativity) in 2007. Chaired by an 
economist, the late Walter Santagata, the White Paper concentrated on industrial 
sectors rather than categories of creative work. Distinctions were drawn between 
material culture, content industries, and artistic and historical heritage. In Stefano 
Rolando’s words, the point was to bring together ‘il valore del “bello e utile”’ (‘the 
value of “the beautiful and the useful”’). The creative turn taken in London a decade 
earlier, and by then endorsed in Brussels, provoked an attempt to measure the total 
value of the creative sectors in Italy, in particular, the percentage of GDP and the 
workforce for which these accounted.  
 
Santagata’s report aimed to delineate an Italian ‘model of creativity’ to assist national 
development and establish a statistical basis for international comparison. The 14 
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designated fields of activity were analogous to, but significantly different from, the 
well-worn nostrums of the UK’s DCMS. They were: creative cities, design and 
material culture, fashion, architecture, the knowledge economy, advertising, cinema, 
TV, radio, publishing, the food industry, contemporary art, music and cultural 
heritage (Santagata 2007: XI). 
National differences persist about which creative industries include or exclude, in 
keeping with the diverse institutional development of each state. In Germany, the 
term Kulturwirtschaft was the starting point for discussing the ‘creative industries’. In 
2007, on the basis of its report, Kultur in Deutschland, the Bundestag agreed upon an 
official federal definition, intended to bring statistical consistency to research and 
analysis.  
 
The term […] Creative Industries, is generally and broadly applied to [...] 
those cultural or creative enterprises [...] that predominantly operate 
commercially and are concerned with the creation, production, 
distribution and/or medial (sic) circulation of cultural/creative goods and 
services.  
Included under the definition of ‘Cultural Industries’ are the following 
core sectors: the music industry, the literary market, the art market, the 
film industry, radio, the performing arts, the design industry, architecture 
and the press. The term ‘Creative Industries’  incorporates additional sub-
segments that include the advertising industry, the software/gaming 
industry as well as a category denoted as ‘miscellaneous’. (As originally 
translated from German in Projektzukunft, 2008: 5; cf. Reich 2013: 16). 
This is another variation on the theme of classification, with creative industries on this 
occasion clearly subordinate to cultural industries. Both the German and Italian 
examples link the need for categorization to the desire for measurement, a matter of 
growing importance for the global governance of the creative economy, and a policy 
question in its own right for bodies such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO).  
By 2012, the question of how to measure the CCIs was firmly on the EU agenda. In 
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parallel with wider arguments rehearsed elsewhere (Cunningham 2014; Cooke and De 
Propris 2011) innovation policy had also been adjusted to include ‘smart 
specialization strategies’ sensitive to the creative economy and KEA (2012: 30) had 
been commissioned ‘to create a benchmarking raster … or set of indicators, to 
measure policies focusing on local economic development through CCIs’. The new 
framework was intended to aid European regional and urban centres in accessing EU 
structural funds, with the central focus of the new toolkit on ‘policy instruments 
which impact on local economic and business development’ (KEA 2012: 3). However 
unevenly, a dominant way of seeing was being established in the EU.  
The approach outlined above extended to the EP. In a report for its Committee on 
Culture and Education on how culture could be used in the interests of cohesion, an 
appeal was made to European solidarity beyond the economy, with a clear recognition 
of the strains and stresses provoked by the present economic crisis. The report, 
speaking of a ‘paradigm shift’ in recognition of the connections between ‘different 
dimensions of culture’, noted key moves in European policies but also bluntly 
underlined the inadequacy of that acknowledgement, given that culture was not 
merely ‘a sector but a resource’ that – conceived more broadly – might enhance EU 
social and economic development in multifold ways and ‘keep the European utopia 
alive’ (European Parliament 2012: 10, 15). 
While, the term ‘culture’ was deployed in line with the EP’s broad preference, the 
overwhelming focus was on its economic and social uses, underlining the present 
emphasis on an instrumental approach, inflected by the incorporation of creative 
economy thinking. It is not surprising then, that in Brussels as in London, the 
economic value of European culture is routinely summarized in a familiar kind of 
headline statement: that the creative sectors represent more than 3 percent of 
European GDP and employ some 3% of the EU’s workforce (EC 2016). 
Alongside such regional shifts, as have taken place in Europe, the globalization of 
these ideas has been best illustrated by UNESCO’s series of three Creative economy 
reports, the first of which, published in in 2008, called the creative economy a ‘new 
development paradigm’ covering all forms of cultural work. Diverse political regimes 
and distinct levels of economic development have shaped the specific take-up of ideas 
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originally minted in London. These have been indigenized in East Asia, China and 
Australasia (Flew, 2012).  
 
Some now argue that the 2013 version of the trio of United Nations reports has 
represented a challenge to the dominant discourse and, in effect, is subverting it from 
within. Great hopes are placed on rehabilitating of the idea of a ‘cultural economy’ – 
with the emphasis on culture rather than economy, on the social rather than the 
individual (Isar 2015). Although such views do not occupy the mainstream, they are 
part of an international counter-discourse to that of the creative economy.  
 
The practical embodiment of ideas 
Cultural policy is by no means exclusively concerned with economic outcomes. But 
its dominant focus on accountability through quantitative measures has set the 
parameters for bodies intervening in the cultural sphere – whether these be arts 
councils, museums and galleries, public service broadcasters, operas and orchestras or 
theatres and libraries. This takes us into the realm of ‘cultural intermediaries’, a term 
influentially deployed by Pierre Bourdieu (1984). A little-studied area until recently, 
this is now of growing academic interest (Smith Maguire and Matthews 2014). 
 
One telling instance of the impact of creative economy orthodoxy in the UK may be 
illustrated by the case of the BBC, still the UK’s premier mainstream cultural and 
journalistic body and a brand of huge importance in the serious global game of 
exercising ‘soft power’.  
 
The future orientation of the BBC will be decided after the conclusion of a process 
known as the Charter Review. The new Charter will run until 2027. The Review is 
meant to be a period of reflection that occurs every decade to revisit the BBC’s 
purposes, scope and scale, and to result in a new deal for the British public (and by 
extension for the global audiences that increasingly access the BBC’s output).  
 
Under political pressure, the BBC has sought to redefine its legitimacy. Positioning 
itself for the Charter Review its submission to the UK government’s consultation was 
tellingly titled British Bold Creative. It was not just the title, though, that proclaimed 
membership of the creative club. The corporation professed its ambition to become 
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‘Britain’s creative partner and a platform for this country’s incredible talent and the 
work done by its great public institutions’ (BBC 2015: 6). The UK Government 
responded in kind. It enjoined the BBC to make ‘supporting the creative industries 
[…] the heart of its operations, taking care to minimize any undue market impacts’ 
(DCMS 2016b: 10).  
 
The case of the BBC reflects the increased normalization of creative industries 
thinking. The discursive mélange of constant gardener and patriotic marketer captures 
perfectly the reflex, modal way of talking about the role of culture in the public 
sphere, across arts bodies, support agencies, government and indeed higher education. 
Ever-ready creative partners proclaim their virtue and relevance by being useful to the 
national or global economy. 
The extent of this thinking can readily be judged from the publications routinely 
produced by the major British arts and cultural organizations. Its depth of penetration 
may be illustrated by some of my most recent research into British cultural agencies 
where, together with colleagues, I have illustrated the ideological force of policy 
intervention by government in shaping the work of bodies officially designated part of 
the creative economy.5  
 
In what follows, I wish to use the term ‘cultural intermediaries’ in a particular sense: 
to describe public bodies whose mission is to make the creative economy work more 
effectively in line with the overarching national goals pursued by states. In that 
regard, although the examples presented here concern British agencies, the 
organizational rationales pursued are typical of many bodies worldwide that have 
been set up to intervene purposefully in culture. 
 
First, we should note the importance of the distinct institutional landscapes within 
which such support agencies work. They are shaped by a distinct history of policy 
ideas as well as fashionable thought about what at any moment constitutes relevant 
know-how for intervening in, and building, a competitive creative economy. Each 
agency connects with its political masters and funders, its clientele, and a range of 
businesses of diverse scales. Most typically, the latter are small- to medium-sized 
enterprises or microbusinesses.  
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One of our studies, which took the form of both contemporary history and cultural 
sociology, concerned the creation, life and death of the UK Film Council (UKFC) 
(Doyle et al. 2015). The UKFC was the strategic body set up in 2000 to bring an 
elusive ‘sustainability’ to the film industry and culture in Britain. Based in London, its 
institutional life lasted for just over a decade. Film policy, constantly oscillating 
between cultural and economic goals, was the Ur-model for the wider creative 
industries policies now in place in the UK. Yet, even in the digital age film policy has 
retained a certain distinctiveness – which underlines the continuing importance of the 
distinct sectors that persist within the creative industries framework.  
 
After a decade’s intervention, on the agency’s demise nothing really fundamental had 
changed: crucially, the British film industry was still fragmented – ‘unsustainable’. 
There were some positive outcomes: the key form of support for the British film 
industry, inward investment in UK film production by the USA, grew; British box 
office receipts increased somewhat; the digitization of exhibition was accelerated; 
regional film funding rose. Ironically, the Oscar-winning movie, The King’s Speech, 
was an outstanding post mortem success for a defunct agency, which had part-funded 
this production. 
 
The political architects of creative industries policy - the first New Labour 
government – had created the Film Council for industrial reasons. The British Film 
Institute (BFI), until then the premier film body, tasked with a primarily cultural role, 
became a subordinate institution. This was a strong signal of the pre-eminence of 
industrial purposes over cultural policy. A decade later, the UKFC was summarily 
closed down on supposed efficiency grounds by Conservative ministers at the start of 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010-15. More money 
was spent than saved by shifting its functions – ironically – into the BFI. Now this 
body itself has been repurposed – defined as a creative industries body that straddles, 
and must negotiate, industrial and cultural priorities that often diverge (BFI 2012). 
Viewed historically, film policy in the UK has produced a scrapheap of defunct 
agencies – each originally set up to make things more efficient. What has not 
changed, though, is the state’s interest in managing a prime cultural industry. 
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Our second case concerns an ethnographic, sociological study of a Scottish business 
support agency, Cultural Enterprise Office (CEO), set up in Glasgow by a coalition of 
public sector bodies in 2001 (Schlesinger et al. 2015a). A true embodiment of the 
creative turn, the formation of CEO was typical of moves taking place all over the UK 
at the time.  
 
We found that, over its lifespan, whichever political party was in power, intervention 
in the Scottish creative economy was modelled on the received wisdom produced by 
policymakers, think tanks and academics working in London – the pre-eminent centre 
of such thinking in Europe. In this inherited policy framework, CEO assisted 
microbusinesses in Scotland to become more ‘businesslike’, providing ‘soft’ business 
support – advice and training. This type of intervention is one of the instruments that 
policymakers use when trying to increase the scale and robustness of creative 
enterprises, although it can be really difficult for support bodies of this kind to 
demonstrate the impact of their intervention to funders.  
 
The two studies discussed above focused on the mediation of policy – the day-to-day 
implementation of policy-influenced practice in the cultural field that occurs in 
response to the formulation of grand ideas, such as that of building a globally 
competitive creative economy. Completed only recently, they have demonstrated the 
tenacity of dominant ideas and the extent to which intervention by cultural 
intermediaries is deeply influenced by policy frameworks and the supporting 
discourses that both justify and amplify them. Of course, on the ground, public policy 
initiatives may be cherry-picked by those in creative work, and what are seen as 
irrelevant ideas simply ignored. Such stratagems, however, do not change the overall 
picture. Variants of creative economy thinking have set the terms of reference for any 
sort of entry to the conversation. 
 
Shaping the academic agenda 
Cultural intermediation of an analogous kind also occurs in higher education. At least 
30 universities around the UK – my own included – presently offer undergraduate and 
masters courses in the creative and/or cultural industries, or the creative economy, 
with or without some explicit admixture of the digital dimension – and this kind of 
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provision is emulated elsewhere. What holds for teaching also applies to research. 
Like their counterparts in other countries, the UK Research Councils have invested 
heavily in research into the creative and digital economies. This agenda has developed 
hand in glove with that of government policy, to which the Research Councils are 
extremely responsive. Although their priorities do not determine the precise scope of 
what research can be done, like all agenda setting, the themes laid down by such 
influential funding bodies and the terms in which they are presented do tell us what to 
think about, even if disaffectedly. 
 
In parallel with public cultural bodies, the institutionalization of the creative economy 
agenda in British universities has developed apace. The bevy of degree courses 
already mentioned supplies talent for a saturated and largely under-paying 
marketplace, where personal connections count hugely, unpaid internships are 
common, and in which precarious ‘portfolio’ work is the norm – although these tough 
conditions do not diminish its attractiveness, as Angela McRobbie (2016) has shown 
in her illuminating studies. Aware of the fragility of such forms of cultural work, she 
contends that a reflexive pedagogy ‘permits … “shards of light” to emerge as 
prefigurative forms of social understanding and political consciousness’ (McRobbie 
2016: 9-10). On her evidence, though, this progressive take appears to be more a 
consolatory belief than an unambiguously demonstrable conclusion. In many respects, 
the exigent conditions of work in the creative sectors sum up the state of play for 
generations entering the wider job market right now as members of the ‘precariat’ 
(Standing 2011). 
Along with the growth of university courses, in the past few years the UK Research 
Councils have been committed to research on the creative economy and the 
overlapping ‘digital economy’ and to effecting brokerage between the higher 
education and creative sectors. Similar kinds of investment have been made in other 
countries.  
A key illustrative initiative in the UK was the establishment of five major university 
consortia, four of which were designated ‘knowledge exchange hubs for the creative 
economy’. 6  The fifth grouping was set up as a research centre, with a remit to 
research copyright and new business models in the creative economy.7 At the end of 
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2016, all of these centres came to the end of their funded four-year lifespan, although 
it seems highly likely that the research focus on the creative economy will continue.8 
Such initiatives mobilize significant numbers of academic researchers and organize 
their connections with a range of enterprises, artists and performers, public bodies and 
governments, and therefore understandably become a focus of public accountability 
for money spent (AHRC 2015). Engagement of this kind can undoubtedly be valuable 
because academics are also citizens and may benefit society by their knowledgeable 
involvement outside the academy. Arguably, we should use our expertise to play into 
policy debate and advice. That said, how we do this, and on what terms, is surely a 
major matter for discussion. My own participation in the work of several bodies 
concerned with the creative economy has certainly given me insights into the 
pressures these encounter, not least from government and major business interests 
determined to pursue their own goals. It has also added considerably to my 
professional academic knowledge of how things really work. 
 
In essence, then, the terms of trade for academic researchers of the creative economy 
are ambiguous, not least in the much-vaunted pursuit of ‘knowledge exchange’ with 
the worlds of practice, which is extremely complicated (Schlesinger et al. 2015b). 
Although the programmatic approach currently taken by the UK Research Councils 
does not necessarily exclude any particular project nor preclude the possibility of 
critique, the framework has been shaped by the continuous demand to demonstrate the 
relevance of the research or engagement in question to the overarching aim of 
building up specific sectors of the national economy so that these will operate more 
effectively under conditions of global competitiveness.  
Countervailing trends? 
Of course, the creative turn has not been an exclusive goal but rather a dominant one.  
In this section, I shall retain the focus on currents at play in the British case which, 
given its wider influence, may portend wider shifts. Let us consider two recent 
interventions that have begun to sound a different note, repositioning the creative 
economy in relation to wider conceptions of first, cultural policy, and second, cultural 
value. 
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In the first instance, the UK Government published The Culture White Paper in 
March 2016. This was proudly proclaimed to be the first such document since 1965, 
and underlined the broad value of culture to British society, noting the importance of 
three types of cultural value:  
 
–  the intrinsic value: the enriching value of culture in and of itself;  
–  the social value: improving educational attainment and helping people to be 
healthier; and  
–  the economic value: the contribution culture makes to economic growth and 
job-creation.  (DCMS 2016a: 15) 
It has been rare for ‘intrinsic value’ to be taken seriously by governments in recent 
years. ‘Social value’, which fits a broadly utilitarian calculus, has certainly figured in 
the thinking of all governments, but has not been accorded the weight of ‘economic 
value’, as will be clear from the argument so far.  
 
Perhaps the new, expressly cultural turn is not too surprising, as the UK has been 
convulsed of late by a number of crises that take a cultural form. These include 
anxieties in major sections of the public about the extent of migration from the EU 
and immigration more generally; the UK’s ambivalent relationship to the EU, 
evidenced by the ‘Brexit’ Referendum of 23 June 2016; the existence of home-grown 
jihadism and both official and public concern about the social integration of some 
elements of the British Muslim community; and the continuing challenge to Great 
Britishness of the quest for Scottish independence. Appeals to the creative economy 
really cannot offer a new roadmap for how to address such shortcomings in the 
workings of UKanian culture. It is no accident, surely, that the official cultural policy 
agenda has broadened precisely to take in concern about social inclusion, building 
employment opportunities for ethnic minorities and economically disadvantaged 
young people, and how to address and capitalize on the UK’s growing diversity. As 
the present cultural crisis is also a crisis of the British state, is it surprising that how 
the UK projects itself internationally – the question of its ‘soft power’ and ‘brand’ – 
and how it attracts visitors and tourists, also figure large?  
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All of this, however, plays in the White Paper against the Conservative government’s 
enthusiastic advocacy of reductions in public support for the cultural sectors and its 
encouragement to those working in these fields to make good the shortfall by raising 
more private funds. In the end, one must conclude, it is not so easy to abolish the 
continuing salience of the creative economy under the nominal cover of cultural 
policy. When providing figures about the economic value of culture, recourse was 
made in the White Paper to the government’s creative economy statistics (DCMS 
2016a: 16). Moreover, when discussing the uses of a ‘measurement framework’ that 
‘seeks to consolidate evidence on the value of culture’, the White Paper not 
surprisingly noted that assessing the impact of cultural policy was ‘strongest for 
economic development. For personal wellbeing, educational attainment, life chances 
and soft power, more work is needed to refine how we measure the specific impact 
that culture makes’ (DCMS 2016a: 58). It remains to be seen, therefore, whether this 
is a first step on a new road or – more likely – simply the setting up of a diversion on 
an old one. 
The second example concerns a report published by the AHRC in April 2016. This 
summed up the results of the Research Council’s ‘cultural value project’, an initiative 
taking up ‘the imperative to reposition first-hand, individual experience of arts and 
culture at the heart of enquiry into cultural value’ (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016). 
This intervention intended, inter alia, to question the primacy of economic value and 
was also an attempt to reframe the purposes and character of evaluation in the 
prevalent discourse and policy framework.9 Although this initiative sought to extend 
the Research Council’s agenda in the field of cultural research, it was recognized that 
the very concept of cultural value ‘may be seen as a construct of policy’ and that, 
consequently, research has ‘tended to be driven by the case for public funding, and 
this has led to a focus on the publicly-funded arts’ (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016: 
24). In short, the project itself was unavoidably framed by the creative economy 
agenda to which it has been a riposte and therefore constrained to broaden debate 
without, however, surmounting the original epistemological obstacle.  
This effort to enlarge the scope of what is relevant to academic research has made use 
of the concept of an ‘ecology of culture’, stressing the interconnections of distinct 
publicly-funded, commercial, third-sector, amateur, and participatory practices. While 
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it is important to note this existing complexity, the concept of a cultural ecology is 
itself freighted with unexplored meaning. Unnoticed by the authors, in the context of 
the UK, where the multinational character of the state is under deep strain, the use of 
ecological metaphors may be interpreted not only as a way of virtuously conjoining 
diverse cultural funding regimes and practices but also – much more significantly – as 
one of carelessly erecting enclosures around the component national cultures of the 
state. In the context of arguments for Scottish independence, consider the potential 
political uses to be made of an English or a Scottish cultural ecology. 10 Cultural 
ecologies can easily be reformulated as ‘national ecologies’, with profound 
consequences for identities.11 
Conclusion 
Since the creative economy became a policy object, this has gradually given rise to a 
supporting ‘creative economy industry’, which is not only national but also 
international. Academic research and publishing have become an important part of 
this, alongside the incessant flow of reports from policy advisers, creative consultants, 
and conferences organized by profit-driven ideas brokers and interest groups.  
 
The espousal of creative economy thinking means that culture is seen primarily as 
embodying tradable economic value. A self-sustaining, self-referential framework of 
ideas has developed that has become largely impervious to critique. The 
omnipresence of creative economy thinking raises questions about how the research 
agenda is being formulated and the consequent positioning of academics in debate. 
  
To note the prevalence of the economic dimension does not at all mean that other 
valuations of culture have been eclipsed. There are counter-discourses and, as has 
been shown, the expediency of policy means that compromises can be effected and 
different registers adopted, according to circumstances. Mostly beyond the imaginings 
of the policy world, people continue to engage in cultural practices for their inherent 
satisfaction, the pursuit of aesthetic goals, their own and others’ fulfilment and self-
development. Craft sensibilities – such as those that shape the patient achievement of 
high-level skills or the fastidious making of objects, described so well by Richard 
Sennett (2008) – have not disappeared.12  
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If we stopped talking about the creative economy would anything be lost? Hardly. We 
still have ways of discussing human inventiveness and originality. Nothing stops us 
speaking comprehensibly about the diversity of cultural practices that continue to 
exist but which have long been overshadowed by a compelling label of convenience 
that has put the economy in the driving seat and shaped the public discourse so 
insistently. Surely, that is enough of an invitation to think afresh. 
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Notes 
1 This point is considered later when discussing the role of ‘cultural intermediaries’. 
2 I was a member of the boards of Scottish Screen (the erstwhile national audiovisual 
agency) from 1997 to 2004, and of TRCMedia (a not-for-profit media training body) 
from 1998 to 2008.  I have also been a member of the Advisory Committee for 
Scotland of Ofcom (the UK communications regulator) from 2004 to date, and since 
2014 of that body’s Content Board. In respect of the latter, this article has been 
written in a purely professional academic capacity and any views expressed here are 
entirely my own. 
3 In the six lines above, I have drawn directly on Schlesinger et al. (2015a: 15). 
4  The Green Paper (EC 2010: 5) aimed ‘at capturing the various connotations 
ascribed to the terms “cultural” and “creative” throughout the EU, reflecting Europe's 
cultural diversity.’ It defined ‘cultural industries’ as  
producing and distributing goods or services which at the time they are 
developed are considered to have a specific attribute, use or purpose 
which embodies or conveys cultural expressions, irrespective of the 
commercial value they may have. Besides the traditional arts sectors 
(performing arts, visual arts, cultural heritage – including the public 
sector), they include film, DVD and video, television and radio, video 
games, new media, music, books and press.  
For their part, ‘creative industries’ 
 use culture as an input and have a cultural dimension, although their 
outputs are mainly functional. They include architecture and design, 
which integrate creative elements into wider processes, as well as 
subsectors such as graphic design, fashion design or advertising. 
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5 Although that work draws out some features of current practice in the UK it has 
much wider, comparative implications.  
6 Funded until April 2016, these were: The Creative Exchange; Design in Action; 
Creative Works London; and REACT. 
7 CREATe. I must declare an interest. I have been Deputy Director of this centre from 
its inception; its funding ends in December 2016. 
8 In June 2016, the AHRC issued a call for candidates competing to become Creative 
Economy Champion to consolidate existing work and shape future strategy and 
partnerships in the field. 
9 The category of ‘experience’ is treated as conceptually unproblematic in this project, 
being characterized as ‘fundamental and irreducible’ (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016: 
21) – itself a highly questionable assumption. 
10 In an as yet unpublished paper on ‘Cultural Policy and Ecology’, I have argued that 
the underlying holism underplays culture’s agonistic qualities and that the concept of 
the cultural ecosystem biologises culture, thereby turning the analyst into a ‘doctor’ 
concerned with its health and ailments. For instances of such curative thinking, see 
Holden (2015) and The Warwick Commission (2015).  11 An analogous point about constructing English history in ways that ignore the UK’s 
other nations has been made by Thomas (2016: 73).  
12 McRobbie (2016: 13-14 and Ch.6) has reservations about Sennett’s idealization of 
craft, not least because of his treatment of gender. But his work, nonetheless, offers an 
important normative counter-narrative to that of the creativistas. 
 
 
